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THE “PADILLA ADVISORY” AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
BEYOND THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
Hanh H. Le*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine Frank Jones, a fifty-year-old disabled man. Frank recently lost his part-
time job at the grocery store. Without this additional income, Frank’s social security
income and limited savings are not sufficient to cover his monthly bills for food, rent,
and medical expenses. Struggling with his living expenses, Frank decides to apply
for federal public housing. To his dismay, Frank soon learns he is ineligible for
housing benefits. Thirty years ago, as a foolish nineteen-year-old, Frank made some
mistakes and ultimately pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Since
this incident three decades ago, Frank has had no further brushes with the law. And
yet, because of his criminal record, he is now ineligible for safe and affordable public
housing. With no family or close friends, Frank has nowhere else to turn and may
become homeless.
Frank’s dire situation illustrates the problem of “invisible punishments”1—the
various collateral consequences that attach to criminal convictions.2 Even though
such sanctions can impose much harsher and more longstanding penalties that often
outlast formal criminal sentences, they are often known as “secret sentences.”3 This
is because, under current law, neither attorneys,4 nor the court, and certainly not the
prosecutor, are required to advise criminal defendants of collateral sanctions. In fact,
not a single actor in the criminal justice system is burdened with this duty. Thus,
criminal defendants across the country routinely waive their constitutional rights to
trial and enter guilty pleas without realizing all the consequences of their criminal
convictions. Fortunately, Padilla v. Kentucky5 may soon change this legal landscape.
* William & Mary School of Law, J.D., 2012; University of Michigan—Ross School of
Business, B.B.A., 2005. I am indebted to Corey Preston, my Notes Editor, for his invaluable
advice and comments on earlier drafts of this Note. Special thanks to the editors of the William
& Mary Bill of Rights Journal for their assistance and hard work.
1 Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT 15 (Marc Maever & Neda Chesney-Lind eds., 2003); see discussion infra
Part I.C.3.
2 See infra notes 19–28 and accompanying text.
3 Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 700 (2002); see discussion infra
Part I.C.3.
4 See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
5 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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With its 7–2 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, rendered on March 31, 2010, the
Supreme Court greatly expanded criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to
effective counsel. In holding that Jose Padilla’s constitutional rights were violated
when he was not advised about the deportation-related consequences of his guilty plea,
the Court imposed a new duty on defense attorneys, requiring them to warn noncitizen
defendants about the deportation consequences of their convictions, even though
deportation is a collateral consequence outside of court-imposed punishments.6
Justice Alito noted that the majority decision would mark “a major upheaval in Sixth
Amendment law,”7 while some scholars have referred to Padilla as one of “a hand-
ful of Supreme Court decisions in the past [fifty] years that can be said to have trans-
formed the operation of the criminal justice system.”8 Perhaps this is because the
logic of Padilla cannot, and should not, be limited to the immigration context. At
the core of the Padilla decision is the Court’s acknowledgment that “deportation is
an integral part” of punishment for noncitizen defendants.9 However, there are other
collateral consequences that are equally important for citizen defendants, and the
logic of Padilla thus extends beyond the immigration context.
This Note argues that the “Padilla advisory”10 requirement—which imposes on
defense attorneys a duty to advise clients about collateral consequences of criminal
convictions—should be extended to collateral sanctions that are (1) “integral parts”
of punishment; (2) objectively and reasonably important to a group of uniquely po-
sitioned defendants; and (3) rooted in clear and unambiguous federal law. Together,
these prongs serve a number of important functions. They ensure that the rationale for
this proposed expansion is in line with the Court’s reasoning in Padilla v. Kentucky.
The prongs are also designed to screen out facially frivolous claims and limit addi-
tional burdens the Padilla advisory might otherwise impose on defense attorneys.
Applying the proposed standard to a case study, this Note also advocates for an ex-
tension of the Padilla advisory to the loss of eligibility for housing benefits, cash
assistance, and food stamps as a collateral consequence of criminal conviction.
Part I provides an overview of collateral consequences, their scope, and their
effects on the lives of convicted persons. As Part I also explores, the collateral con-
sequence rule, which has been adopted in most jurisdictions, does not require
6 Id. at 1480–81.
7 Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring).
8 Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to
Padilla v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21; see also McGregor Smyth, From
“Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on
Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 801 (2011) (referring to Padilla as “the
seismic evolution”).
9 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
10 Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The “Major Upheaval” of Padilla v. Kentucky,
Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2010, at 37 (noting that “the ‘Padilla advisory’ may become as familiar a fixture
of a criminal case as the Miranda warning”).
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attorneys to advise criminal defendants about potential collateral sanctions attached to
criminal convictions. As such, defendants challenging their guilty pleas on the grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel usually face uphill—and often losing—battles in
litigating their claims. Part II provides a factual background about Padilla v. Kentucky,
explains the Court’s rationale in reaching its decision, and ultimately argues for a
limited extension of the “Padilla advisory.” Part III develops a three-prong test that
attempts to distinguish collateral consequences that would warrant a Padilla advi-
sory from those that would not. Part IV applies this proposed standard to the loss of
eligibility for federal housing benefits, cash assistance, and food stamps, and argues
that the Padilla advisory should be extended to include these collateral consequences.
Finally, Part V discusses some practical considerations and concludes that a limited
extension of the “Padilla advisory” is an important and much-needed step toward
transparency in the collateral consequences context.
I. OVERVIEW OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Criminal convictions carry two types of consequences: direct and collateral.
Direct consequences, considered part of the conviction, are “explicit punishment[s]
handed down by the court.”11 Examples of “[d]irect consequences include . . .
duration of . . . prison sentence, . . . the defendant’s parole eligibility or imposition
of fines,” to name a few.12 Collateral consequences, considered “legally separate
from [a] criminal sentence,”13 encompass a variety of civil sanctions (often known
as “civil disabilities”).14 Some collateral sanctions are imposed at the discretion of
agencies acting independently of the criminal justice system (such as civil courts or
administrative agencies),15 while others “attach automatically upon [a] conviction by
operation of law.”16 Together, these “civil sanctions . . . limit the convicted individuals’
social, economic, and political access,”17 “chip[ping] away at critical ingredients of
[their] support systems” and severely damaging their social safety net.18
11 Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 623, 634 (2006).
12 Id. (citations omitted).
13 Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences
and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1074 (2004).
14 Id.
15 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMMITTEE, AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-1.1(b) (2004)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (discussing consequences imposed by a civil court or ad-
ministrative agency).
16 Pinard, supra note 11, at 635.
17 Id. at 634–35.
18 Travis, supra note 1, at 18.
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A. Scope
Collateral consequences can impact almost every aspect of convicted felons’
lives.19 Some collateral sanctions have an immediate impact and directly impair
felons’ abilities to rebuild their lives. For example, convicted felons may become
temporarily or permanently ineligible for public housing,20 welfare assistance,21 and
healthcare benefits.22 Other collateral sanctions limit the scope of convicted felons’
future opportunities. Persons with criminal records are ineligible for various forms
of employment, particularly those “that require professional licenses.”23 They may
also lose eligibility for federal student loans24 and never obtain higher education as
a result. Other kinds of collateral consequences leave an even more permanent mark
and act as exclusion mechanisms, preventing convicted felons from full participation
as members of our society long after their sentences are served and their debts to
society are repaid. These collateral consequences can include disqualification from
service on a federal jury,25 disqualification from enlistment in the armed forces,26 or
19 For an overview of collateral consequences imposed by federal law, see OFFICE OF
THE PARDON ATT’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION [hereinafter FEDERAL STATUTES], available at http://
www.justice.gov/pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf.
20 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (providing that “any criminal activity
that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
tenants, . . . [or] by persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises, or any drug-
related criminal activity on or near such premises . . . shall be cause for termination of
tenancy”); 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(f) (2006) (denying eligibility to persons convicted of illegally
manufacturing or producing methamphetamine on the premises of federally assisted housing);
42 U.S.C. § 13663(a) (2006) (denying eligibility to persons “subject to a lifetime registration
requirement under a State sex offender registration program”).
21 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2006) (denying food stamps and cash assistance to anyone
convicted of a felony for conduct that involves “the possession, use, or distribution of a
controlled substance”).
22 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2006) (denying participation in Medicare and state health care
programs to persons with convictions of program-related crimes, or convictions related to
patient abuse, health care fraud, or controlled substances).
23 See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 156 (1999) (noting that
convicted felons can be ineligible for professional licenses “rang[ing] from lawyer to bartender,
from nurse to barber, from plumber to beautician”); see also Clyde Haberman, Ex-Inmate
Denied Chair (and Clippers), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at B1 (describing the struggle of a
returning offender, who was denied a barber’s license because of his criminal history).
24 See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2006) (persons convicted of drug-related offenses, committed
while enrolled at higher education institutions, are ineligible for any grant, loan, or work
assistance, including Pell grants and benefits under the federal work-study program; the ineli-
gibility can be temporary or indefinite).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2006). This applies to persons who have a charge pending, or
have been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year. See id.
26 10 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). The Secretary of Defense may, however, grant an exception in
meritorious cases. Id.
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loss of the right to vote.27 Perhaps the most visible form of social exclusion is the
potential deportation of noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents, after a
criminal conviction.28
As the above examples illustrate, collateral sanctions affect almost every aspect
of convicted persons’ lives, and their impact should not be underestimated.29 Collateral
consequences impose significant hurdles on prisoners’ paths to reintegration and pre-
vent them from enjoying the full benefits of citizenship.30 In many cases, collateral
consequences can outlast direct sentences and end up imposing “harsher and more
longstanding penalties than . . . formal criminal sentence[s].”31
B. Invisibility
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of collateral consequences is their invis-
ibility. Not surprisingly, Jeremy Travis calls collateral consequences “invisible
punishment[s].”32 The invisibility of collateral sanctions has multiple dimensions.
First, collateral sanctions are punishments, imposed in addition to formal criminal
sentences, “accomplished through the diminution of the rights and privileges of
citizenship and legal residency in the United States.”33 Second,“these punishments
27 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES (Mar. 2011), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs
_fdlawsinusMar11.pdf. Voting restrictions are imposed by means of state law. See id. (noting
that “[forty-eight] states and the District of Columbia prohibit inmates from voting while
incarcerated for a felony offense[,] . . . [thirty-five] states prohibit persons on parole from
voting,” and “four states deny the right to vote to all persons with felony convictions”).
Although states have developed processes of restoring voting rights to convicted felons,
restoration processes are rather cumbersome and few convicted felons take advantage of
them. See id. (discussing policies in each state).
28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (listing grounds on which an alien may be
removed from the United States, such as conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, an
aggravated felony, and other offenses related to controlled substances, trafficking, firearms,
national security, and domestic violence). The Supreme Court acknowledged that deportation
was an “integral part . . . of the penalty” imposed on noncitizen criminal defendants in
Padilla v. Kentucky. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010); see also discussion infra Parts II.A–B.
29 Many collateral sanctions were introduced during the “tough on crime” and “war on
drugs” movements in the 1980s and 1990s, when Congress dramatically expanded the scope
of these sanctions. For further discussions on this point, see Travis, supra note 1, at 22–25.
30 Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REV. 255, 273 (2004) (noting that collateral consequences are effectively “social
exclusions . . . [that] relegate ex-offenders to the margins of legitimate society, stigmatizing
them and further highlighting their separation from law-abiding members of society”).
31 Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
585, 590 (2006).
32 Travis, supra note 1, at 15.
33 Id. at 15–16 (noting that it is difficult to “adequately measure the reach of these expres-
sions of the social inclination to punish,” as these laws “operate largely beyond public view”).
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. . . take effect outside of the traditional sentencing framework” and thus, are not
“incorporate[d] . . . into the debates over sentencing polic[ies] . . . .”34 Third, and
perhaps most importantly, there is no comprehensive collection of all collateral
sanctions. Instead, collateral consequences are scattered throughout federal and state
statutes and local regulations.35 Without a comprehensive summary of all collateral
sanctions, it is difficult to quantify the effect of these consequences or analyze their
scope.36 Further, without a summary, any attempts by defense attorneys to advise their
clients of potential collateral consequences are almost futile.37 In fact, most participants
in the criminal justice system, including judges, defense lawyers, and prosecutors, do
not fully appreciate “the existence and scope of collateral consequences,”38 and as a
result, defendants are not informed about collateral consequences when they enter
guilty pleas.39 Moreover, defendants who want to challenge their guilty pleas post-
conviction face an uphill battle in attempting to satisfy the elements of a successful
Sixth Amendment ineffective counsel claim.40
C. Legal Treatment
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The Supreme Court has interpreted criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right
to assistance of counsel41 as the right to effective assistance of counsel.42 In Strickland
v. Washington,43 the Court developed a two-prong test for evaluating claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel.44 The first prong—also known as the “performance”
or “constitutional deficiency” prong—assesses whether an attorney’s representation
was below an objective standard of “reasonableness under prevailing professional
34 Id. at 16.
35 Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues
of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 489–90 (2010).
36 Id.
37 Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) (noting that “a central problem with
collateral consequences is the unstructured and ad hoc manner in which they are identified
and imposed”).
38 Pinard, supra note 13, at 1080.
39 Defendants’ unawareness of collateral consequences is also due to the collateral con-
sequence rule, which deems advice regarding collateral matters outside the scope of an
attorney’s duty. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
40 See discussion infra Parts I.C.1–2.
41 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”).
42 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (noting that “the right to counsel
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added))).
43 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
44 Id. at 687.
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norms.”45 The second prong—also known as the prejudice prong—requires a showing
that an attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant’s defense and that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”46
The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to all stages of prosecution,
including the plea-bargaining stage.47 Hill v. Lockhart was the first Supreme Court case
that applied the Strickland two-prong test in the guilty plea context.48 Defendants who
believed they would not have pled guilty had they been aware of a particular collateral
consequence were allowed to challenge the voluntary and intelligent character of their
guilty pleas if they could satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test.49 To bring a suc-
cessful claim, defendants must show that the advice they received was not “within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” (the performance
prong),50 and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [they]
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” (the prejudice
prong).51 Prior to Padilla, it was almost impossible for criminal defendants to satisfy
the performance prong—i.e., show that their counsel’s failure to advise them about col-
lateral sanctions was below the objective standard of competence demanded of defense
attorneys. This is because of the so-called collateral consequence rule discussed below.
2. The Collateral Consequence Rule
The collateral consequence rule is based largely on the Supreme Court’s rationale
in Brady v. United States,52 in which it held that due process only required trial courts
to explain direct consequences to defendants prior to accepting guilty pleas.53 Thus,
pleas were considered voluntary as long as defendants were “fully aware of the direct
consequences.”54 Over the years, lower courts have relied on this rationale, reasoning
that if a plea was voluntary when trial courts explained direct consequences, “defense
counsel’s failure to do more cannot render the plea involuntary.”55 As scholars have
noted, “the extension of [the Brady rationale] to defense counsel’s duties under the
45 Id. at 688. The reasonableness standard is typically evaluated by looking at the
“practice and expectations of the legal community . . . .” Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1482 (2010).
46 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
47 See McMann, 397 U.S. at 769 (holding that before deciding whether to plead guilty, a
defendant is entitled to effective assistance of competent counsel).
48 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
49 Id. at 56.
50 Id. (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
266–67 (1973).
51 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
52 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 726.
53 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 726.
54 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
55 Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 726–27 (quoting cases from the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits embracing this rationale).
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Sixth Amendment, although never passed upon by the Supreme Court, is nevertheless
among the most widely recognized rules of American law.”56
Today, the collateral consequence rule—holding that warnings about collateral
sanctions are beyond the scope of defense attorneys’ duties—is accepted in most
jurisdictions.57 Accordingly, lower courts use the distinction between direct and col-
lateral consequences in evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the
plea context.58 This seemingly straightforward application of the bright-line rule has
been explained in a number of ways. Some courts find the civil/criminal distinction
dispositive and note that collateral consequences are merely civil penalties.59 Others
focus on the agency that imposes the punishment, explaining that collateral conse-
quences are beyond the control of the sentencing courts, as they are imposed by agen-
cies independent of the criminal justice system.60
The collateral consequence rule became the main obstacle for defendants who
believed they were prejudiced during the plea-bargaining process and would not have
pled guilty had they known of a particular collateral consequence. As a result of this
rule, defendants simply could not raise a successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claim during their post-conviction challenge.
3. Why Awareness of Collateral Consequences Matters
Scholars have long criticized the collateral consequence rule. After all, collateral
sanctions are “invisible punishment[s]”61 that impose “harsher and more longstanding
56 Id. at 706.
57 Id. at 699. “Eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia”
have adopted the collateral consequence rule. Id.
58 See, e.g., Slater v. State, 880 So. 2d 802, 803–04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting
defendant’s claim that his plea of no contest should have been set aside because neither the
court nor his attorney advised him that his parental rights would be terminated as a result of
a plea); State v. Wilkinson, No. 20365, 2005 WL 182920, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2005)
(denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because neither the trial court nor his
attorney informed him the plea could “jeopardize his nursing license”).
59 See, e.g., People v. Boespflug, 107 P.3d 1118, 1121 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
“the loss of the right to vote while imprisoned is not a punishment” but merely a “deprivation[ ]
of liberty” during incarceration, and “no advisement is required”); Commonwealth v. Duffey,
639 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. 1994) (holding that “loss of driving privileges is a civil collateral
consequence” and not a criminal penalty).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that col-
lateral consequences are beyond the control of the sentencing court); Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d
781, 782 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that before pleading guilty to driving while intoxicated,
defendant need not be informed that his driver’s license will be suspended because the sus-
pension is imposed via a separate Department of Public Safety proceeding); Commonwealth
v. Shindell, 827 N.E.2d 236, 238 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that no advisement about the
possibility of registration as a sex offender is required, because the “fact that an entity outside
the court decides whether the defendant ultimately must register is the very definition of a
collateral consequence”).
61 Travis, supra note 1, at 15.
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penalties than . . . formal criminal sentence[s],”62 and often outlast direct consequences.
Yet, “no point along the criminal justice continuum . . . formally addresses issues re-
lated to collateral consequences.”63 Not surprisingly, many scholars have long advo-
cated for more transparency with regard to collateral sanctions.64 The American Bar
Association (ABA) has also taken the position that “it is neither fair nor efficient . . .
to label significant legal disabilities and penalties as ‘collateral’ . . . when in reality
those disabilities and penalties are frequently the most important and permanent
results of a criminal conviction.”65 In an effort to bring more transparency to these
“secret sentences,” the ABA adopted the “ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions
and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons”66—a coherent and com-
prehensive compilation of collateral consequences.
A “holistic representation” model,67 proposed by many scholars, may be another
way to bring transparency to these collateral matters. The model calls for defense
attorneys to “concern themselves more generally with the broader legal effects of a
criminal conviction”68 and advise criminal defendants about collateral sanctions.69
The push for more transparency is particularly compelling in cases involving rela-
tively minor offenses, for which the collateral consequences are, in fact, the real
punishments. As illustrated by the case of Frank Jones, our hypothetical friend from
the Introduction, the effects of these collateral sanctions can be felt decades after the
conviction. But even more importantly, collateral sanctions can limit future opportu-
nities and, in many ways, shape the future experiences of convicted felons. That was
certainly the case with Frank. Frank was a freshman in college when he was arrested
and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Because Frank was a first-
time offender, the prosecution offered a suspended sentence and community service.
Frank did not spend a single day in jail. Although his formal sentence was rather
insignificant, the real penalty was not the probation. Rather, it was the imposition
of collateral consequences that attached to Frank’s conviction and followed him for
62 Pinard & Thompson, supra note 31, at 590.
63 Pinard, supra note 11, at 629–30.
64 See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 3.
65 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 11.
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Pinard, supra note 13; McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A
Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishment as an Advocacy Strategy,
36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 490 (2005).
68 Chin & Love, supra note 8, at 37 (discussing the heightened duties of defense attorneys
in the wake of Padilla); see also Smyth, supra note 8, at 810 (arguing that Padilla implies
“a rational duty of counsel to inquire into, investigate, advise about, and use strategically a
wide range of penalties enmeshed with criminal charges”).
69 See, e.g., Travis, supra note 1, at 17 (arguing that collateral consequences “should be
brought into open view[,] . . . made visible as critical elements of the sentencing statutes[,]
. . . recognized as visible players in the sentencing drama played out in courtrooms every
day[,] . . . openly included in . . . debates over punishment policy, incorporated in . . .
sentencing jurisprudence, and subjected to rigorous research and evaluation”).
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the rest of his life. Frank ultimately dropped out of college after he lost eligibility for
federal student loans. Due to his criminal record, Frank was disqualified from apply-
ing for many professional licenses, and his job opportunities were limited.70 Decades
after his conviction, as a senior citizen, Frank was still experiencing the collateral
consequences of his conviction, in that he could not apply for public housing.
There are many more examples that illustrate the severity of collateral conse-
quences. The following are just a few:
• A plea to disorderly conduct, [a non-criminal offense under New York
law,] makes a person presumptively ineligible for New York City public
housing for two years.
• Two convictions for turnstile jumping can lead to deportation of a lawful
permanent resident.
• A conviction for any crime bars a person from being a barber, boxer, or
bingo operator.71
Frank’s story, and the examples above, illustrate how collateral sanctions can be-
come the “real punishment” for many criminal defendants. These collateral sanctions
often have much broader and more severe effects on convicted persons’ lives than the
actual sentences imposed by the courts.
Undoubtedly, the collateral consequence rule plays a significant role in further ex-
acerbating the “invisibility” of collateral sanctions. But Padilla v. Kentucky may offer
a promising change, and the Court’s rationale and holding could be a meaningful step
toward transparency and fairness, long called for by scholars and legal professionals.
II. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY AND THE “PADILLA ADVISORY”
A. Factual Background
Jose Padilla was born in Honduras and came to the United States as a teenager.72
He had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over forty years and
served in the United States military during the Vietnam War.73 Prior to his conviction,
Padilla lived with his family in California and worked as a licensed commercial truck
driver.74 On September 17, 2001, Padilla’s truck was stopped at a weigh station because
it did not have a weight and distance number.75 With Padilla’s consent, police
70 For an overview of statutory penalties that are triggered following a criminal conviction,
see discussion supra Part I.A.
71 Smyth, supra note 67, at 482 (citations omitted).
72 Brief for Petitioner at 8, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 2, Padilla, 130
S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
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officers searched his truck and discovered more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana in 23
wrapped styrofoam boxes, which were not accounted for in the shipping manifest.76
After an unsuccessful attempt to suppress evidence seized during the search,77 and
per his attorney’s recommendation, Padilla pled guilty to misdemeanor possession
of marijuana, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and felony trafficking
in marijuana.78 The prosecution recommended five years of imprisonment, followed
by five years of probation.79 On October 4, 2002, the trial court accepted Padilla’s
guilty plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence.80
According to immigration regulations, all noncitizens, including lawful permanent
residents like Padilla, are subject to deportation proceedings should they run afoul
of certain laws.81 Unknown to Padilla, his felony drug conviction was an aggravated
felony and a violation of controlled substance laws,82 both of which are deportable
crimes under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).83 Subsequent to his arrest,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated an investigation to de-
termine whether Padilla was subject to removal proceedings.84
On August 18, 2004, two years after entering his guilty plea, Padilla filed a pro se
collateral attack on his conviction.85 Padilla’s motion for post-conviction relief alleged
a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel, because his attorney mis-
advised Padilla regarding possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea.86
Padilla claimed his attorney not only failed to advise him that deportation was virtually
mandatory in his case, but in fact told him he “did not have to worry about [it] . . . since
he had been in the country so long.”87 This affirmative act of misadvice added a layer
of complication to the collateral consequence rule and its application in the Sixth
76 Brief of Respondent at 2–3, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) [hereinafter Brief
for Respondent].
77 Id.
78 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 72, at 9.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006) (defining classes of deportable aliens and listing de-
portation grounds).
82 According to Kentucky statutes, a first offense of trafficking in five pounds or more
of marijuana is a Class C felony and is punishable by imprisonment for five to ten years. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A.1421(4)(a), 532.060(2)(c) (2011).
83 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) (defining “aggravated felony” within the meaning
of the INA). The INA provides that any alien who, at any time after admission, is convicted
of an aggravated felony, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), or convicted for violation of controlled sub-
stance laws, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), is deportable.
84 Brief for the United States, supra note 75, at 2.
85 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 72, at 11.
86 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (2008), overruled by 130 S. Ct. 1473
(2010).
87 Id.
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Amendment ineffective counsel claims context. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to settle the issue.88
B. Procedural History
The procedural history of Padilla v. Kentucky illustrates how lower courts have
struggled with the collateral consequence rule and an attorney’s duty to his clients
with regard to collateral matters. Initially, the trial court denied Padilla’s motion and
noted that “a valid guilty plea [did] not require that the defendant be informed of every
possible consequence of a guilty plea.”89 The appellate court reversed and remanded
for a determination of whether Padilla had received incorrect advice, and whether this
incorrect advice prevented him from entering a “knowing, intelligent and voluntary
guilty plea.”90 Although the appellate court agreed that advice about collateral con-
sequences is not required, the court found Padilla’s attorney’s affirmative act of mis-
advice legally significant, and held that such “‘gross misadvice’ relating to collateral
matters can justify post-conviction relief.”91
The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, took a different approach. The court did
not find the distinction between a failure to advise and an affirmative act of misadvice
meaningful.92 Embracing the collateral consequence rule and its principle that collat-
eral consequences are outside the scope of Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel,
the court reversed the appellate court and denied Padilla’s post-conviction challenge.93
In doing so, the court noted that because attorneys are not required to address col-
lateral issues, their “failure in that regard cannot constitute ineffectiveness entitling
a criminal defendant to relief under Strickland v. Washington.”94 Thus, according to
the court, neither counsel’s failure to advise, nor his affirmative act of misadvice
regarding collateral issues, provided a basis for relief.95
The United States Supreme Court, acknowledging the “unique nature of
deportation,”96 reversed, but carefully crafted a narrow holding. Expanding the
scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, the Court imposed a duty
on defense attorneys to advise their clients of adverse immigration consequences of
a guilty plea.97 The Court emphasized that deportation could not be easily classified
as either a collateral or direct consequence “because of its close connection to the
88 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
89 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
90 Brief for Respondent, supra note 76.
91 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483–84.
92 Id. at 484–85.
93 Id. at 485.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 484–85.
96 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
97 Id. at 1482 (citations omitted).
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criminal process,”98 and found the direct/collateral distinction “ill-suited” in evaluat-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context of deportation.99 Applying
the Strickland two-prong test,100 the Court held that Padilla met Strickland’s perfor-
mance prong because his attorney failed to inform him about the deportation con-
sequences of his guilty plea,101 and remanded the case for a determination of whether
Padilla also met the second prong and could demonstrate prejudice as a result of his
attorney’s deficient performance.102
C. Rationale for Limited Extension of the “Padilla Advisory”
Since Padilla was decided, scholars have opined about the decision’s potential
impact on the criminal justice system.103 Even the concurring justices conceded that
the majority decision “mark[ed] a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law.”104
Indeed, Padilla is the first time the Court suggested that defense counsel may have
a duty to discuss collateral issues “wholly outside the control of the criminal court, if
the issue is sufficiently important to the defendant . . . .”105 It has been speculated that
“the ‘Padilla advisory’ may become as familiar a fixture of . . . criminal case[s] as the
Miranda warning.”106 Scholars and commentators, in search of ways to address the
wrongs of collateral consequences, have relied on Padilla to argue for various practical
strategies to combat these harms, such as increasing informed choices for criminal
defendants,107 and creative lawyering by prosecutors and defense counsels alike.108
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also discussion supra
Part I.C.1.
101 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
102 Id. at 1487.
103 See, e.g., Chin & Love, supra note 8; Love & Chin, supra note 10; see also Seventh
Annual Wiley A. Branton-Howard Law Journal Symposium, Collateral Consequences: Who
Really Pays the Price for Criminal “Justice”?, 54 HOW. L.J. 501 (2011).
104 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring).
105 John Castellano, Castellano on Padilla v. Kentucky, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4959
(Apr. 13, 2010) (emphasis added).
106 Chin & Love, supra note 10, at 37.
107 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675 (2011) (arguing that open considerations of
collateral consequences ensure fully informed pleas, increase client autonomy, and reduce the
number and severity of undeserved collateral consequences); Smyth, supra note 8 (arguing
that in the wake of Padilla, lawyers have a duty to inquire, investigate and research, and advise
on consequences of pleas or sentencing and seek alternatives, all of which will empower
clients to make truly informed decisions).
108 See, e.g., Catherine A. Christian, Collateral Consequences: Role of the Prosecutor, 54
HOW. L.J. 749 (2011) (arguing that prosecutors have an ethical obligation to prevent unjust col-
lateral consequences and suggesting a number of pre-conviction actions prosecutors should take).
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Indeed, since some collateral consequences can be particularly important to a
defendant, it is hard to see how the criminal justice system can impose these additional
“punishments” without a single actor having a duty to inform the defendant about col-
lateral sanctions.109 Defense attorneys routinely advise clients regarding pleas, and these
discussions necessarily involve an assessment of risks and benefits of going to trial
versus pleading guilty.110 Thus, it cannot be said that attorneys provide effective rep-
resentation when these discussions do not take into consideration the effects of collat-
eral consequences.111 Accordingly, the Padilla advisory should be extended to other
collateral consequences beyond the immigration context. Although there are many
reasons for such an extension, the three main reasons, which warrant more in-depth
discussions, are discussed below.
1. Collateral Consequences Are Not Separate from Criminal Penalties
As previously discussed, the collateral consequence rule is primarily based on
a conception of collateral sanctions as indirect and separate consequences, entirely
outside criminal courts’ control and separate from the criminal process.112 The key
rationale underlying the Padilla Court’s decision is that deportation is uniquely dif-
ferent from other collateral consequences. The Court specifically noted that depor-
tation is “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty
that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty”113 making it difficult
to “divorce the penalty [i.e., deportation] from the conviction . . . .”114
However, the idea of other, non-immigration-related collateral consequences
being “divorced” and completely separate from the criminal penalty is not entirely
correct.115 These “invisible punishment[s]”116 are, in fact, “secret sentence[s]”117 that
perform “[t]he real work of the conviction.”118 This is particularly true when defendants
are first-time offenders who plead guilty to avoid jail time (perhaps in exchange for
community service or probation), only to discover later the collateral consequences
109 Pinard, supra note 11, at 629–30 (pointing out that the criminal process has no “formal
mechanism that incorporates the scope of [collateral] consequences,” and that “no point along
the criminal justice continuum . . . formally addresses issues related to collateral consequences”).
110 Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 698, 718.
111 Id. at 736.
112 See id. at 704; see also supra Part I.C.2.
113 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (citation omitted).
114 Id. at 1481.
115 In fact, collateral consequences are not separate from the criminal process at all. In
some states, for example, the statute allowing for pleas of nolo contendere “was designed to
cover situations where side effects of a plea of guilty, in addition to the penalties provided
by law, would be too harsh.” Fortson v. Hopper, 247 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Ga. 1978); see also
Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 699 (citations omitted).
116 Travis, supra note 1, at 15.
117 Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 700.
118 Id.; see also Smyth, supra note 8, at 808 (citation omitted) (noting that “the real calculus
of criminal justice entails much more than a binary guilt/innocence equation”).
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that will affect almost every facet of their future lives—from having their driver’s
licenses suspended, to becoming ineligible for federal student loans, to even, possibly,
losing their parental rights.119 For some citizen defendants, collateral consequences
that are relevant and particularly important to their unique situations can certainly con-
stitute an “integral part” of the punishment, just as deportation is an “integral part”
of the punishment for noncitizen defendants.
2. Defendants Unaware of Collateral Consequences Cannot Be Said to Have
Properly Waived Their Constitutional Right to Trial
Given the severity of some collateral sanctions, the collateral consequence rule
is inconsistent with the standards for proper waiver of constitutional rights outlined
in Brady.120 By entering a plea, defendants forfeit their constitutional rights to trial be-
fore a jury or a judge.121 The Brady court noted that “[w]aivers of constitutional rights
not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”122 Thus, defendants
are, and certainly should be, “entitled to make [the] decision [about whether to enter
a plea] based on considerations that they deem important.”123 To some defendants,
knowledge of certain collateral consequences can be an important consideration as
they contemplate entering a guilty plea.124 This is particularly true for first-time of-
fenders and offenders who have committed less serious felonies or misdemeanors.
Without the awareness that collateral sanctions will affect almost every facet of their
lives for many years to come, it cannot be said that these defendants have waived
their constitutional rights with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences.”125
3. Knowledge of Collateral Consequences Will Provide Attorneys with New
Advocacy Tools
Actions of defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges at the guilty-plea stage are
particularly important to the accuracy and fairness of the criminal justice system. With
over ninety percent of convictions resulting from guilty pleas, the criminal justice
119 The Adoption and Safe Families Act mandates that state child welfare agencies initiate
termination proceedings against biological parents if they have not had contact with a child
in fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-89 § 103, 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (1997); see also discussion supra Part I.A.
(presenting an overview of laws imposing a variety of collateral consequences).
120 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
121 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
122 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
123 Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 735 (emphasis added).
124 See, e.g., id. at 713 (discussing how noncitizens consider risks of deportation when
contemplating guilty pleas).
125 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
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system heavily relies on the plea-bargaining stage.126 Thus, one of the most impor-
tant pieces of advice defense lawyers give their clients is “whether to plead guilty and
on what terms.”127 Knowledge of collateral consequences will allow defense attorneys
to forge creative dialogues with prosecutors and form a plea agreement that avoids
“absurd or disproportionate” consequences.128 This knowledge can also be used as an
advocacy tool for both defense counsels and prosecutors.129
The following stories, based on actual cases, illustrate how knowledge of relevant
collateral consequences can allow defense attorneys to better protect their clients’
interests. With the cooperation of prosecutors, defense counsels can formulate plea
offers that will neither offend a basic sense of fairness and justice nor put individuals
with criminal convictions at a further disadvantage. In his article, Holistic is Not a
Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishment as
an Advocacy Strategy, McGregor Smyth outlined the following scenarios:
• Juan R. was disabled and lived in public housing. He was charged with a
drug-related offense. His attorney, aware of public housing rules on ter-
mination of tenancy for criminal activity, persuaded the prosecutor to
accept a non-criminal disposition so Juan could keep his home. Any con-
viction, even a misdemeanor, would have resulted in Juan’s eviction.130
• Joanne F. worked as a security guard. She was charged with assault and
harassment in a domestic dispute with her boyfriend. The prosecution’s
plea offer would have resulted in Joanne losing both her job and her secu-
rity guard license. Joanne’s attorney convinced the prosecutor to offer an
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal.131
• Max S. was charged with possession of marijuana. He was eighteen years
old and about to start college in the fall. His attorney discussed with the
prosecutor that even a non-criminal plea to a drug offense would render
Max ineligible for federal student loans and thus, unable to attend college.
The prosecutor was persuaded and offered an adjournment in contem-
plation of dismissal. Max started college in the fall.132
126 Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 698 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, at 432–33 tbl.5.32 (Ann L.
Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2000)).
127 Id.
128 Smyth, supra note 67, at 494–95.
129 See, e.g., Christian, supra note 108, at 752 (calling for prosecutors to conduct indi-
vidualized assessments of collateral sanctions “to ensure that justice is achieved”); Smyth,
supra note 67, at 494.
130 Smyth, supra note 67, at 495.
131 Id.; see also id. at 495 n.91 (“In New York, with consent of the prosecution and defense,
a court can order a . . . case adjourned in contemplation of dismissal, subject to certain
conditions, such as no further arrests during the adjournment or paying a fine or restitution.”).
132 Id. at 495.
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Knowledge of and familiarity with collateral consequences can help attorneys
represent their clients’ interests more effectively. Thus, assessment of the full rami-
fications of criminal convictions should include a discussion of collateral consequences.
This would not only provide criminal defendants with pertinent information, enabling
them to make informed decisions on how to proceed, but would also “elevate[ ] the
provision of legal services by fully contextualizing the representation.”133 And, most im-
portantly, a holistic approach and individualized assessment of collateral sanctions—
tailoring the punishment to the crime—is consistent with the criminal justice system’s
goals of fairness and justice.134
III. PROPOSED STANDARD FOR LIMITED EXTENSION OF THE PADILLA ADVISORY
This Note argues for a limited extension of the Padilla advisory to include other
collateral consequences outside of the immigration context. The Padilla Court’s ratio-
nale that deportation—“because of its close connection to the criminal process”135—
is an “integral part”136 of punishment for noncitizens cannot, and should not, be limited
to the immigration context. Surely, there are other collateral consequences that are
equally important to citizen defendants and can constitute “integral part[s]” of their
punishments. Once this proposition is accepted, the key issue becomes where to draw
the line, i.e., which collateral consequences mandate a Padilla advisory and how de-
tailed an attorney’s advice must be.
Unlike other literature on the topic,137 this Note takes a limited position and argues
that the Padilla advisory should only extend to those collateral sanctions that are (1) an
“integral part” of punishment; (2) objectively and reasonably important to a group of
uniquely positioned defendants; and (3) rooted in clear and unambiguous federal law.
This proposed standard strikes an important balance between two competing interests:
aspirational and fairness-driven considerations, such as the need for greater transpar-
ency of collateral consequences and a holistic approach of representation, and purely
practical concerns, such as finality of guilty pleas, costs and inefficiencies incurred
by the criminal justice system or undue burdens on defense attorneys. Although schol-
ars and commentators have relied on the Padilla decision to argue for improved advo-
cacy practices by defense counsels and prosecutors, the existing literature appears to
133 Pinard & Thompson, supra note 31, at 609.
134 See, e.g., Christian, supra note 108, at 750.
135 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010).
136 Id. at 1480.
137 For example, McGregor Smyth proposed a more expansive approach and argued that
the Padilla decision and prevailing professional standards mandate that when a collateral
consequence is severe, enmeshed with the criminal charges, and likely to occur, defense
counsels have a duty to inquire, investigate and research, advise on consequences of pleas
and sentencing, and seek alternatives. Smyth, supra note 8, at 810–22.
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be more aspirational than realistic.138 The standard proposed in this Note has the added
benefit of being practical—it accounts for the lack of compilation of all collateral
consequences, but calls for transparency of a limited number of collateral sanctions
when the law is unambiguous and requiring a Padilla advisory does not pose undue
burdens on defense attorneys.
A. Prong 1: “Integral Part” of the Punishment
At the core of the Padilla decision is the Court’s acknowledgment that deportation
is different from other collateral consequences.139 Because of “its close connection to
the criminal process,” deportation is neither a collateral nor a direct consequence.140
Noting that changes to immigration laws “dramatically raised the stakes of a non-
citizen’s criminal conviction,”141 the Court deemed “deportation . . . an integral part—
indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants.”142 This is surely true in the case of Jose Padilla. Padilla came
to the United States as a teenager.143 As a lawful permanent resident of the United
States for over forty years, Padilla built his entire life in America and was a full mem-
ber of the society.144 In fact, he pledged allegiance to the United States by serving in
the Vietnam War.145 Banishment from the United States is indeed an “integral part”
of his punishment, in addition to a jail sentence. If deported, Padilla would be sep-
arated from his family in the United States and sent back to his “home” country, where
he likely has no family, friends, or acquaintances. Thus, it is understandable that ad-
verse immigration consequences are a central consideration as Padilla, and other
noncitizen defendants like him, contemplate a guilty plea.
While the Court’s holding in Padilla was narrow and limited to the immigration
context, other collateral sanctions can present equally challenging issues for citizen
138 For example, Professor Chin advocates for open considerations of collateral consequences,
but recognizes that “it is unreasonable to expect ordinary attorneys to make themselves familiar
with the details of an entire state code addressing scores of discrete areas of law” and that
“the trick [in achieving this aspirational goal of holistic representation] is learning how to
generate and maintain lists of collateral consequences for each jurisdiction.” Chin, supra note
107, at 685. Similarly, Smyth’s proposed standard, advocating for defense attorneys to “provide
affirmative, competent advice to clients of the risk of all penalties sufficiently ‘enmeshed’
with their criminal charges or potential pleas” is, as conceded by Smyth, “a relatively high
minimum standard” that is contingent on the availability of a comprehensive summary of all
collateral consequences. Smyth, supra note 8, at 819–20 (emphasis added).
139 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
140 Id. at 1482.
141 Id. at 1480.
142 Id. (citations omitted).
143 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 72, at 8.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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defendants, just as deportation does for noncitizen defendants. The Padilla advisory
should thus extend beyond the immigration context and include other collateral con-
sequences that are an “integral part” of punishment for citizen defendants. This prong
limits the advisory requirement to collateral sanctions that have such severe and ad-
verse consequences for citizen defendants that they could, and should, be viewed as
an “integral part” of the punishments imposed.146 An example of a collateral sanction
that satisfies this element is loss of eligibility for public assistance benefits. For many
low-income individuals with criminal convictions, this sanction can be an “integral
part” of their punishments; without access to public housing, food stamps, or cash
assistance, the reintegration process is extremely difficult. Together, these collateral
consequences create “a formidable set of obstacles to former offenders who want to
gain a foothold in modern society.”147 Accordingly, these sanctions can pose the same
challenges to returning offenders as deportation does to noncitizen offenders.
B. Prong 2: Objectively and Reasonably Important to a Group of Uniquely
Positioned Defendants
The second prong extends the Padilla advisory to collateral consequences that af-
fect a uniquely positioned group of criminal defendants, to whom a particular sanction
is objectively and reasonably important. This inquiry, based on an objective test, serves
two important functions. First, the prong brings a degree of stability for defense attor-
neys as to which defendants require a notification. For example, if the Padilla advi-
sory is extended to loss of eligibility for public assistance benefits, public defenders
and court-appointed counsels can be on heightened alert, because their clients, by
definition, are low-income individuals who cannot afford private representation. It
would also be reasonable to infer that loss of public assistance benefits is particularly
relevant and objectively important to them.
Second, this prong limits the scope of extension of the Padilla advisory, as it
screens out certain facially frivolous claims. For example, the Padilla advisory
would not extend to loss of the right to vote or suspension of driving privileges;
defendants in these two circumstances do not meet the “uniquely positioned” ele-
ment of this prong, because most adults have a driver’s license and all citizens over
the age of eighteen have the right to vote. Low-income individuals, on the other hand,
are a “uniquely positioned” group. Because of their reliance on public assistance
benefits, awareness of this collateral sanction is objectively and reasonably impor-
tant to the group.
146 McGregor Smyth’s proposed standard contains a similar prong—i.e., that the collateral
penalty meet the test of severity, either on a relative or absolute scale. Smyth, supra note 8,
at 822–24.
147 Travis, supra note 1, at 24.
608 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:589
C. Prong 3: Rooted in Clear and Unambiguous Federal Law
The third and final prong of the proposed test would ensure that the extension of
the Padilla advisory would not impose an undue burden on defense attorneys. As pre-
viously noted, there is no comprehensive compilation of all collateral sanctions, and
these sanctions are scattered throughout federal and state laws and local policies.148
Although it is important to bring more transparency to these collateral sanctions, it is
equally important that the expansion of the Padilla advisory does not impose an undue
burden on defense attorneys. Already overworked, public defenders, court-appointed
attorneys, and defense lawyers in general cannot be required to become well-versed
in other areas of law or conduct additional research to gain comprehensive knowl-
edge regarding collateral consequences. Accordingly, this prong extends the Padilla
advisory to collateral consequences rooted in clear and unambiguous federal law,
easily accessible to attorneys. In effect, this prong only extends the Padilla advisory
to the collateral consequences summarized in Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral
Consequences upon Conviction, compiled by the Department of Justice (DOJ).149
This expansion of defense attorneys’ duties is reasonable for two reasons. First, this
invaluable DOJ resource is readily available and provides a one-stop reference for all
collateral consequences imposed under federal law.150 The reference guide allows attor-
neys to easily access relevant information and eliminates the need to spend additional
time and resources researching relevant collateral consequences. Second, extending the
Padilla advisory to collateral sanctions based on federal laws ensures that attorneys
across the country are subject to the same standard and level of competence. States and
localities can impose different collateral consequences based on local laws. Even when
collateral consequences are rooted in federal law, states are free “to opt out of certain
consequences, or broaden or narrow their scope” as appropriate.151 However, defense
attorneys need not be knowledgeable about how states implement a particular collat-
eral consequence. The Padilla advice need only be limited to a simple warning that a
particular collateral consequence may apply, so defendants are put on notice.
IV. CASE STUDY: LOSS OF HOUSING BENEFITS, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND
FOOD STAMPS
The following case study applies the proposed three-prong standard to loss of
housing benefits, welfare rights, and food stamps.152 But first, to understand the need
148 Pinard, supra note 13, at 1080; see also supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text
(discussing difficulties associated with disparate laws).
149 FEDERAL STATUTES, supra note 19.
150 See id.
151 Pinard, supra note 35, at 490. It is worth noting that the federal government often
imposes various financial and political incentives to encourage adoption of collateral con-
sequences in local jurisdictions. Id.
152 Although ineligibility for federal housing and welfare benefits applies to other con-
victed persons as well, this case study focuses on the impact of these collateral sanctions on
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for expansion of the Padilla advisory to these collateral sanctions, one needs to under-
stand the importance of welfare and housing benefits to low-income felons. Some
collateral consequences, such as those that deny returning offenders “civil and political
rights[,] serve a more symbolic function and largely concern only individuals.”153
Collateral consequences that deny social and welfare benefits to returning offenders,
however, not only directly impact their own well-being, but also that of their families.154
Most importantly, the denial of these benefits creates significant hurdles in the rein-
tegration process.
A. Denial of Federal Housing Benefits
“Exclusionary housing policies constitute one of the most significant barriers
to reentry.”155 For many returning offenders, public housing is the only realistic option
for a safe and stable place to live. Over the past twenty years, federal housing laws have
undergone significant changes, which have resulted in strict admission and eviction
standards and “effectively restricted access to public housing for significant numbers
of ex-offenders.”156 Today, federal laws make it extremely challenging for convicted
felons to find public housing by either prohibiting admission of convicted felons to
those housing units, or allowing for eviction and termination of leases for residents
who engage in certain types of criminal activity.157
First, given the broad language of the applicable federal statute, local public hous-
ing authorities (PHAs) enjoy great latitude in evicting persons from public housing.158
Federal laws give PHAs statutory power to terminate leases of public housing tenants
and their families, and provide that:
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants, [or] . . .
peaceful enjoyment of their residences by persons residing in the
offenders returning to society after release from prison. As the case study illustrates, upon their
release from prisons, these offenders face challenges that are as difficult as those faced by
noncitizen defendants deported to their “home” countries after serving their prison sentences.
153 Demleitner, supra note 23, at 158.
154 Id.
155 Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Access
to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 552 (2005).
156 JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK, FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER
REENTRY 227 (2005).
157 For an overview of federal housing laws affecting individuals with criminal records, see
Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing—Denial of Benefits to Drug
Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT 37, 43–46 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds.,
2003). See also TRAVIS, supra note 156, at 231 (noting that the “powers to evict individuals
from public housing are remarkably broad” and listing specific language allowing for broad
application of these laws).
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
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immediate vicinity of the premises, or any drug-related criminal
activity on or near such premises, engaged in by a tenant of any
unit, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other
person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination
of tenancy . . . .159
In an effort to encourage PHAs to implement these laws, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rolled out the “One Strike and You’re
Out” initiative to carry out the presidential mandate to reinforce these statutes.160
The “one strike” program effectively created “uniform screening tools, admission
standards, and eviction policies toward people with criminal records across public
housing agencies around the country.”161 Federal laws also provide that tenants evic-
ted from public housing because of drug-related criminal activity are ineligible for
federally assisted housing for three years.162
Second, federal regulations outline rather vague admission criteria, effectively
giving PHAs broad discretion to deny admission. For example, “applicants whose
habits and practices reasonably may be expected to have a detrimental effect on the
residents or the project environment” are ineligible for admission.163 Additionally, in
selecting families for admission, PHAs may consider past “criminal acts which would
adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of other tenants.”164 As a result, PHAs
across the country have expanded the types of conduct that preclude individuals from
obtaining public housing.165 And although federal regulations call for PHAs to consider
“evidence of rehabilitation”166—given the high demand for, and shortage of, public
housing—former prisoners seeking admission stand little chance of success.167
The initial goal of these federal housing policies was “to allow [PHAs] to ex-
clude potentially dangerous tenants from premises and ensure the safety of other
residents.”168 However, studies indicate that these policies were often “‘needlessly
159 Id. (emphasis added).
160 See TRAVIS, supra note 156, at 232 (referring to President Clinton’s 1996 State of the
Union address, in which he urged local housing authorities and tenant associations to aggres-
sively use their statutory powers); see also Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 157, at 44.
161 Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 157, at 44.
162 42 U.S.C. § 13661(a) (2006).
163 24 C.F.R. § 960.202(a)(2)(iii) (2011).
164 Id. § 960.203(c)(3).
165 Carey, supra note 155, at 566–69 (discussing local measures excluding prospective
tenants based on prior arrests, or minor or nonviolent offenses).
166 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(d)(1)(i) (2011).
167 See TRAVIS, supra note 156, at 229 (quoting the story of Frank, who pled guilty to
shoplifting and grand theft in 1961 but had no further brushes with the law. Frank was
nevertheless denied admission to public housing when he applied as a senior citizen, forty
years after his criminal conviction.).
168 KENNETH J. NEUBECK, WHEN WELFARE DISAPPEARS: THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC HUMAN
RIGHTS 95 (2006).
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over-broad’ and [became] highly exclusionary.”169 Over time, changes to federal hous-
ing laws have exacerbated the difficulties faced by returning offenders as they rein-
tegrate into communities after completing their jail sentences. Further, these laws
often have a harsh and destabilizing effect on communities, as they punish not only
those who have paid their debts to society, but also their families.170
B. Denial of Welfare Rights and Food Stamps
The welfare system underwent significant changes with the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.171 One provision
of this law imposes a lifetime ban on eligibility for Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) and food stamps for individuals convicted of drug use, possession,
or distribution,172 and a ten-year ban for persons convicted of certain types of fraud.173
The ban applies to all offenders convicted of possession, use, or distribution of drugs
after August 22, 1996.174 “The loss of TANF benefits includes not only the lifetime
loss of cash benefits, but also all employment-related services individual states pro-
vide to those on their TANF rolls.”175
States can “opt out” of the ban completely or otherwise modify it, either by lim-
iting the length of the sanction or imposing additional conditions, such as requiring
drug treatment.176 Currently, “twenty-two states enforce the ban in part.”177 Fourteen
states and the District of Columbia have opted out of the ban entirely.178 The remain-
ing fourteen states continue to adhere to the federal ban;179 in those states, the ban is
“permanent and continues regardless of a person’s successful job history, partici-
pation in drug treatment, avoidance of recidivism, or abstinence from drug use.”180
169 Id.
170 TRAVIS, supra note 156, at 235–36.
171 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
172 Id. § 115, 110 Stat. at 2180.
173 Id. § 408(a)(8), 110 Stat. at 2138–39.
174 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d)(2) (2006). The amount payable to any family or household of
which such an offender is a member is reduced proportionately. Id. at § 862a(b).
175 NEUBECK, supra note 168, at 94–95.
176 § 862a(d)(1) (2006).
177 Pinard, supra note 35, at 494 (citing THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION,
SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 125
(2008) [hereinafter SMART ON CRIME], available at http://2009transition.org/criminaljustice
/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=10&Itemid); see also Rubinstein
& Mukamal, supra note 157, at 42 (noting that the most common modifications to the federal
ban are exemptions for individuals who finished treatment or achieved recovery, or those
who are in treatment or on a waiting list for treatment).
178 Pinard, supra note 35, at 494 (citing SMART ON CRIME, supra note 177).
179 Id.
180 Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 157, at 41.
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The welfare ban also creates a “catch 22” for convicted felons.181 “Without access
to subsistence benefits, treatment, and safe and sober housing,” life in a drug-free en-
vironment and avoidance of recidivism is significantly harder to achieve.182 And so,
“[i]n a vicious circle, losing public benefits . . . [makes] it harder for [persons] with
criminal records to stay clean and sober, avoid abusive relationships, take care of
their children, and resist engaging in criminal activity.”183 And, just like the loss of
federal housing benefits, ineligibility for cash assistance and food stamps creates sub-
stantial hurdles in the reintegration process of many returning offenders.
C. Application of the Proposed Standard
1. Loss of Federal Welfare and Housing Benefits is an “Integral Part”
of the Punishment
The presumption that deportation is important to noncitizen defendants lies in
the acknowledgment that upon their release from prison, offenders will be sent back
to another country and banned from returning to the United States.184 Indeed, the con-
sequences of deportation are severe and extend beyond traumas associated with forced
separation from family, friends, and one’s community.185 Noncitizens who are de-
ported are sent back to their “home” countries, but for those who had lived in the
United States their entire lives, starting over in a foreign country is a particularly daunt-
ing task. They may not speak the language of their “home” country or have any family
members there. Banished to this foreign land, they need to find housing, a new job,
and learn to reintegrate into a new society.
Loss of public assistance benefits—particularly federal housing, food stamps,
and cash assistance—can be an “integral part” of the punishment for indigent citizen
defendants, who rely heavily on public assistance for food and shelter. Just as deported
181 Id. at 42.
182 Id.
183 NEUBECK, supra note 168, at 95 (quoting AMY E. HIRSCH, ET AL., CENTER OF LAW
AND SOCIAL POLICY, EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS 28 (2002)).
184 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006) (providing criminal penalties for certain aliens who sub-
sequently reenter or attempt to reenter the United States).
185 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 523–24 (2007) (discussing types
of harm). Deportation also involves a loss of social security benefits “for which [a noncitizen]
has paid and on which he or she might depend” and emotional and financial losses for U.S.
citizens, lawful permanent residents, “and other family members who are left behind.” Id.
at 513; see also Yolanda Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral
Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54
HOW. L.J. 639, 666–74 (2011) (discussing the impact of deportation of Latinos on the deported
individuals, their families, and the community).
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citizens must rebuild their lives in a foreign country, returning prisoners face an uphill
battle reintegrating into society. Finding housing is the most immediate need for many
returning offenders.186 Without a stable and safe shelter, returning offenders “often end
up swelling the ranks of the homeless” or find themselves in environments otherwise
not “conducive to the development of stable, productive lives. . . .”187 Unable to ob-
tain food, safe housing, and employment as they transition back into the community,
returning offenders are on their own, without any support system from society. Their
path to reintegration includes many difficulties similar to those faced by noncitizens
deported to their “home” countries.
There are further similarities between deportation and ineligibility for welfare
and housing benefits: both have tremendous adverse effects on family relations. Once
deported, a noncitizen cannot come back to the United States.188 The family will be
separated for a long time, particularly if they cannot afford travel expenses. Work and
responsibilities of everyday life can also make overseas visits more difficult. Similarly,
public housing laws can strain family relationships and “interfere with the ability of
families to successfully reunify once a parent [or spouse] has returned from prison.”189
In addition to adversely affecting convicted felons, the one-strike provision “has frac-
tured family structures and . . . limit[ed] housing options . . . for those . . . returning
from incarceration.”190 Returning spouses cannot join their families who live in public
housing, because as a condition to housing, their families have agreed “that ex-offender
family members not only could not live with them, but also would not visit the public
housing unit.”191 Returning parents cannot reunite with their children without secure
and stable housing.192 Although not as difficult as traveling overseas to visit deported
noncitizens, this “housing separation” imposes significant burdens. It places financial
burdens on returning offenders and their families—as the offenders need to find and
pay for another home—and takes away their strongest support system during the
process of reintegration into society: their families.
186 “Of the many challenges . . . none is as immediate as the challenge of finding shelter.
Work can wait. Drug treatment can wait. Most connections to community-based healthcare
can wait.” TRAVIS, supra note 156, at 219.
187 Carey, supra note 155, at 552.
188 Aliens typically must wait a certain period of time before they can apply for re-
admission to the United States, see 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 (2011), although certain waivers from
the Attorney General may be available, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(E), (H), (3)(c) (2008).
Aliens deported for a conviction of aggravated felony face a lifetime bar and cannot reapply
for admission without permission from the Attorney General. § 212.2(f); see also id. § 1326
(providing for criminal penalties for certain removed aliens who subsequently reenter or
attempt to reenter the United States).
189 Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 157, at 48.
190 Pinard & Thompson, supra note 31, at 595.
191 Id. (citing Fox Butterfield, Invisible Penalties Stalking Ex-Convicts, Sanctions Target
Jobs, Housing, Welfare, Voting, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 29, 2002, at A9).
192 Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 157, at 48.
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2. Loss of Welfare Rights and Housing Benefits is Important to Indigent Defendants
Arguably, the Padilla decision is grounded on a presumption that noncitizen
defendants are a uniquely positioned group, to whom deportation is an objectively and
reasonably important sanction.193 The United States is a “nation of immigrants” with
over “32.5 million foreign-born people, about 20 million of whom are noncitizens.”194
For those 20 million people, adverse immigration consequences are uniquely impor-
tant and warrant a warning as defendants consider entering a guilty plea.195 Statistics
regarding federal housing are equally compelling and indicate that a significant group
of criminal defendants rely on federal housing. According to a study conducted in
Maryland, Minnesota, and Ohio, the percentages of prisoners who lived in public
housing and Section 8 housing (the second major federal program for publicly sup-
ported housing) prior to their incarceration were ten and fifteen percent, respectively.196
These statistics “underscore[ ] the importance of federal policies regarding ex-offender
access to [housing] facilities,” as nearly a quarter of individuals leaving prison each
year formerly lived in publicly supported housing.197 Homelessness studies show that
ten- to twenty-five percent of released prisoners become homeless within a year follow-
ing their release.198 Thus, the data clearly indicate that knowledge about the effects of
criminal convictions on eligibility for federal housing subsidies is not only relevant
but also extremely important to a significant number of criminal defendants.
Additionally, assessing their clients’ financial situation and whether they are
dependent on public assistance benefits should not be too burdensome on defense
attorneys. In fact, this task should be easier than inquiring about their clients’ legal res-
idency status. Public defenders and court-appointed counsels work exclusively with
indigent criminal defendants and would be on “heightened alert” that ineligibility for
public benefits is an important consideration as their clients contemplate a guilty plea.
3. Denial of Welfare Rights and Housing Benefits Is Rooted in Clear and
Unambiguous Federal Law
The Padilla Court seems to have suggested two different levels of obligations
for defense attorneys: a higher obligation where the law is clear and deportation is
“presumptively mandatory,”199 and a lower obligation when the law is not “succinct
193 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
194 DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2
(2007).
195 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481, 1484–85.
196 TRAVIS, supra note 156, at 227. There is no comparable study on a national level.
197 Id. at 228.
198 Id. at 240 (hypothesizing that “imprisonment’s disruption of housing arrangements,
coupled with the legal and practical barriers that returning prisoners face in their search for
housing” have likely “force[d] large numbers of former prisoners” to become homeless,
“wander the streets in urban America[,] and live in . . . homeless shelters”).
199 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
2011] THE “PADILLA ADVISORY” AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 615
and straightforward,” in which case lawyers need only warn their clients that “pending
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”200 In rec-
ognizing this distinction, the Court most likely wanted to ensure that defense attor-
neys were not unduly burdened or required to become well-versed in the nuances
of immigration laws.
Extending the Padilla advisory to loss of welfare and federal housing benefits
would not necessarily impose an undue burden on attorneys, because federal law on
this issue is relatively clear. Federal regulations outline rules for exclusions from
public housing and denial of welfare benefits.201 Although state and local agencies
have the discretion to implement their own regulations,202 and the law may vary from
state to state, the Padilla advisory would only require defense attorneys to notify
their clients about potential ineligibility for public benefits as a result of their guilty
pleas. This standard does not require defense counsels to become familiar with state
or local rules of how federal laws are implemented, and certainly does not require
them to become well-versed in welfare benefits or public housing laws.
The goal of the Padilla advisory is to bring certain collateral consequences to
the attention of criminal defendants and provide them with relevant and important
information as they contemplate entering a guilty plea.203 In many cases, warnings
of loss of eligibility for public benefits may not make a difference, particularly when
defendants face serious crimes with long terms of imprisonment, or the prosecution
has overwhelming evidence against them. But the warning could be particularly im-
portant to a certain group of defendants: those heavily dependent on public benefits,
who have a viable chance of success at trial. In those cases, justice demands that de-
fense attorneys provide defendants with important information as they contemplate
entering a guilty plea. And when the law on the collateral consequence is clear, this
justice can be achieved without imposing undue burdens on attorneys.
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Concerns over “Floodgates”
One of the strongest objections against extension of the Padilla advisory is the
“floodgates objection.”204 Scholars and courts worry that such a change would unsettle
200 Id.
201 See supra Parts IV.A–B.
202 Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 157, at 43–44.
203 Extending the Padilla advisory to the loss of eligibility for federal housing and welfare
benefits would allow defendants who subsequently raise ineffective counsel claims, alleging
their attorneys failed to advise them about these consequences, to meet Strickland’s per-
formance prong. See discussion supra Part I.C.1 (explaining when a defendant may attack
his guilty plea). The Padilla advisory has no bearing on Strickland ’s prejudice prong, and
defendants still need to show they have been prejudiced due to their counsel’s unprofessional
errors in order to prevail. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487.
204 Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 736–41.
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a large number of already-obtained convictions and render them uncertain, as con-
victed offenders file motions for post-conviction relief.205 The fear is that these mo-
tions would create a significant burden on an already overloaded judicial system.206
However, a closer look at the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel can dispel
these concerns. The Strickland prejudice prong serves an important floodgate-keeping
function, and its importance cannot be overstated.207 Keeping out potentially meritless
claims, the prejudice inquiry is designed to distinguish “defendants who merely regret
their pleas in hindsight . . . from defendants whose attorneys’ deficient advice skewed
their plea decision at the time.”208 Many defendants, particularly those who plead guilty
to serious crimes with longer terms of imprisonment, most likely cannot “show that
the knowledge or ignorance of a collateral consequence would have had any impact
on their decision.”209 This rationale would also apply in cases in which there is over-
whelming evidence against the defendant; it would not be reasonable for defendants
to subsequently claim they would have gone to trial had they known of a particular col-
lateral consequence. Accordingly, many defendants will not be able to make a showing
that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different”210 and “that a rational defendant[s] in [their] position would not have
[pled guilty] had [they] received competent advice.”211
In some ways, the Padilla advisory will increase litigation, but most likely,
many—if not most—claims could be dismissed on summary judgment. Because
Strickland’s performance prong requires a showing of prejudice, only a limited num-
ber of cases would actually go to trial for a determination of whether knowledge of
a particular collateral consequence would have changed a defendant’s plea. Even if
these limited cases increase the courts’ dockets, this is an important, and much-needed,
step to address the wrongs related to the invisibility of collateral consequences and
achieve justice for criminal defendants.
B. Undue Burden on Defense Attorneys
Extending the Padilla advisory also raises concerns that the duty may impose
undue burdens on defense attorneys and require them to become familiar with new
areas of law. These concerns, however, overlook two important considerations. First,
the law only asks that attorneys make a “reasonable effort” to explore potential conse-
quences that could attach following a criminal conviction.212 A standard of “reasonable
effort” certainly does not require attorneys to become well-versed in areas of law
205 Id. at 736.
206 Id.
207 Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1484–85 (discussing the floodgate function of Strickland).
208 Brief for the United States, supra note 75, at 7.
209 Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 703.
210 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
211 Brief for the United States, supra note 75, at 7.
212 Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 703.
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outside their expertise. “Representation is an art,”213 and attorneys would only have a
duty of “reasonable knowledge and investigation,”214 nothing more and nothing less.
Second, for many defendants, knowledge of collateral consequences will not make
a difference as to their decision whether to plead guilty. Thus, holding attorneys to
a “reasonable standard” merely means that they would need to consider collateral
consequences and discuss them with their clients more carefully when the decision to
plead guilty is a close one, and the balancing of costs and benefits of going to trial ver-
sus entering a plea is not clear-cut.
But perhaps most importantly, the Padilla advisory is not necessarily an undue
burden at all. Instead, it is a step toward “a holistic approach” to representation that en-
compasses various underlying issues defendants face when dealing with the criminal
justice system.215 Already, some public defenders’ offices have shifted toward this
holistic representation and broadened the range of legal services offered to indigent
clients.216 As a result, many of them also provide representation on non-criminal
matters, such as housing and public benefits.217 The holistic approach can also prevent
future criminal involvement, as defendants—with the guidance of their attorneys—
become more knowledgeable about their rights, obligations, and responsibilities under
the law. Extending the Padilla advisory beyond the immigration context is an important
step toward implementation of this holistic representation model.
CONCLUSION
Padilla v. Kentucky extended the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel to include advice about deportation consequences of a criminal conviction.218
The Padilla decision was the first time the Court suggested defense counsel may have
a duty to discuss collateral consequences—issues wholly outside the control of criminal
courts—as long as the issue is sufficiently important to the defendant.219 The Padilla
advisory, however, should not be limited to the immigration context. This advisory
warning should apply to other collateral consequences that are (1) an “integral part” of
punishment (2) objectively and reasonably important to a group of uniquely positioned
defendants and (3) rooted in clear and unambiguous federal law. These prongs ensure
that the rationale for this expansion is consistent with the reasoning underlying Padilla
v. Kentucky. They would also screen out facially frivolous claims and limit additional
burdens the Padilla advisory may impose on defense attorneys.
As the case study illustrated, loss of eligibility for housing benefits, cash assistance,
and food stamps upon a criminal conviction are examples of collateral consequences
213 Id. at 711 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
214 Id. at 703.
215 Pinard & Thompson, supra note 31, at 605–06 (explaining the “holistic approach”).
216 Id.
217 Id. at 606.
218 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
219 Id. at 1480–81.
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that meet the proposed standard.220 Accordingly, the Padilla advisory should be ex-
tended to these collateral consequences, and low-income defendants should be advised
about them prior to entering guilty pleas. Just as deportation is an “integral part” of
the punishment for noncitizens, the loss of federal housing benefits, food stamps, and
cash can be an “integral part” of the punishment for indigent citizen defendants who
rely heavily on public assistance for food and shelter. Without stable and safe housing,
returning offenders find themselves in unsafe environments that are not conducive to
the development of stable and productive lives. Unable to obtain food, safe housing,
and employment as they transition back into the community, the path to reintegration
includes many difficulties for returning offenders similar to those faced by noncitizens
deported to their “home” countries.221
Lastly, justice requires that a limited expansion of the Padilla advisory is adopted.
Collateral sanctions act as secret sentences, and often impose harsher and more long-
standing penalties than the formal criminal sentence.222 Yet, no single actor in the crim-
inal justice system is required to inform criminal defendants about these “invisible
punishments.”223 This shortcoming should be addressed, and a limited extension of
the Padilla advisory can both be a meaningful and important step toward a “holistic
model of representation” and help defense attorneys represent their clients’ interests
more effectively.
220 See supra Part IV.
221 See supra Part IV.C.1.
222 See supra Part I.C.3. 
223 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
